Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin explained in an interview with NV Radio on Oct. 17 how Russian dictator Vladimir Putin is trying to propose a deeper alliance with China and what [Chinese leader] needs from the Kremlin in return.
NV: Putin obviously needs weapons, more weapons, money, political support, and market access for Russia. What do you think he might get from China after his visit?
Klimkin: The Chinese won’t give weapons, they’re not in a mood for weapons. I think they will definitely not cross this red line, the reddest of red lines. They can continue to supply dual-use goods, they will continue to help Putin bypass sanctions, and this is happening not only through China. But at the same time, they will keep him at a distance, because relations between Xi and Putin have fundamentally changed. They’re not just unequal anymore, they’re not balanced. This is the relationship between the one who dominates and the other who is dominated.
And in fact, it’s not only about the economy, but mostly about technology, as well as military capability. I noticed one very interesting thing that happened right before the visit. Perhaps one of our listeners remembers that Putin spoke at the so-called Valdai [Discussion] Club and said a few words about revoking the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). He seems to have said it by accident, but Putin, of course, doesn’t do anything by accident. And right before the visit, the speaker of the Russian Duma [parliament], Vyacheslav Volodin, said: that’s all, let’s get out of this ratification. I think this was done completely deliberately before this visit.
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Putin wants to increase his influence, he won’t succeed, and the value in relation to Xi and say that he’s a partner, a partner in an anti-Western coalition. And I don’t think that the Chinese are part of the axis of evil directly, like today’s Russian regime, but they’re definitely part of the anti-Western coalition. Xi and everyone around him see the world through the prism of struggle and rivalry with the United States. I emphasize, not with the West as such or the collective West that we would like to see, but with the United States. And that’s why he needs Putin, he’ll use him in the future, but keeping him at a distance.
And one last thing I’ll say before we go into more detail. Pay attention to the positions of Russia and China towards us, towards Ukraine. There is now a fundamental crisis around Gaza, in Israel, what are the Chinese doing? They’re very, very careful to say that Israel has crossed the line of self-defense and are calling for a ceasefire. What is the Russian regime doing? At the United Nations, they’re trying to compare what Israel is doing now with how Nazi Germany attacked Leningrad [St. Petersburg]. Here is a fundamental difference in assessments, and not only political, but also moral.
Therefore, I wouldn’t equate the Chinese regime with the Russian one, in particular Xi and Putin. The Chinese will continue to use Russia, but Putin is unlikely to bring something very nice and tasty from Beijing. Yes, maybe a promise to continue bypassing sanctions, which probably will happen. Yes, I think that Xi will talk to him about the Power of Siberia 2 [natural] gas pipeline, which is very, very important for Putin, because Russia is losing gas revenues and here the Chinese will take Moscow to the cleaners with a huge discount.
But for Putin, the key story is a strategic partnership. This is, of course, a partnership in nuclear and digital technologies. And a strategic partnership so that he feels that he’s fighting the United States together, as if on the same level with Xi. But I think he won’t get that. Xi is likely, though not yet confirmed, to meet with [U.S. President Joe] Biden next month during the Trans-Pacific Partnership meeting in the United States. And of course, this meeting with Putin will be absolutely critical for the final formation of Xi’s stance and general understanding of who Putin is for him and what modern Russia is, and what kind of Russian regime it is.
NV: What I thought about is that you mentioned Moscow’s reaction, Putin’s reaction to the attack on Israel. By following the rhetoric of Russian propaganda, we can see that the Russians will call not only Ukrainians, but also Israelis Nazis.
Klimkin: They actually did that, from the UN rostrum at the hearings, which precede the possible introduction of the Russian resolution. They actually compare everyone and everything. And when they compare us to the Nazis, now they’re comparing Israelis to the Nazis. In my opinion, this is the same moral rock bottom, because understanding the Holocaust [the genocide of European Jews during WWII], how it all happened, understanding their shelling on the day when we have a holy day near the Babyn Yar [Memorial Center in Kyiv], everything is completely clear. But their propaganda really knows no bounds. Look at what the Chinese say.
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When they don’t want to say something, they just don’t. We have no comments. And the foreign minister speaks quite cautiously, although he’s in international affairs, …, he knows a lot. And there [in Russia], in general, there are no more limits to what they say, they just say it.
And this, by the way, is a very clear demonstration that it’s not about politics, it’s just about the total degradation of morality, the absence of any basic values. We may not share Chinese values, and of course we don’t share them, but we can look at them, we respect something, we can criticize something. And tell me, what are the values of today’s Russian regime?
NV: mentioned Joe Biden’s upcoming meeting with Xi Jinping and Russia announcing its intention to withdraw from the nuclear test treaty.
I want to ask about these tests. Do you think the Russians will try to conduct some kind of demonstrative act, to test something right before the meeting between Xi Jinping and Joe Biden? And how can it affect this dialogue?
Klimkin: I think they will do it later. I think that today’s Russian logic, I don’t say, resembles the one of Kim Jong Un [North Korean dictator], but they have something like that. When he [Kim Jong Un] needs to show how “cool” he is, usually conducts either a nuclear test or launches a missile. Well, it’s cheaper to launch a missile, which is why he has missiles flying more often. And Putin really needs to offer his services to Xi, he wants to say that, first, he wants to go further in his rivalry with the United States and help him wear the United States down. Because what Putin is starting is actually a nuclear arms race, that’s what it’s called.
Second, it’s absolutely clear that among all the technologies that Russia has, the Chinese need nuclear ones. So far, they have much fewer warheads than Russia and the United States. And Putin shows in this way: look, I’m ready to help China. And this also means, this is the third, that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is now suspended also by the decision of Putin himself, won’t just work bilaterally if China gets more nuclear potential.
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This means that these bilateral negotiations will in some sense lose their meaning, they need to be tripartite, and then we’ll talk about the participation of the British and the French. We also have other countries, we know very well that India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, and not only they. All this means that we’re being dragged into a completely different reality, and Putin wants to shake up this reality. He understands very well that the West is very careful about only one trump card that Russia has today – nuclear weapons.
That is, this is a very well-thought-out strategy: first, the termination of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [in February 2023], then the rhetoric during the Valdai Club meeting, now the decision, which, please note, is voiced not by Putin himself, but by someone from his entourage. And then he comes to Xi and says: well, I’m a friend here, you can do nothing without me, and you cannot wear the United States down without me. And the United States is your enemy for the entire 21st century, Xi. That’s why you should love me.
You should support me in what I do. Although, in my opinion, Xi actually understands Putin’s sort very well, as the Chinese bureaucracy understands the Russian regime’s nature. So, this step to withdraw from the treaty, from ratification, to be precise, is exactly the preparation for the Chinese visit and Putin’s attempt to raise the stakes, precisely the global stakes. We know that Putin, in his logic, is at war with the United States.
NV: And with all of NATO.
Klimkin: Of course, with the entire Western world. By the way, I emphasize the Chinese aren’t at war with the entire Western world, they’re “at war” with the United States. They’re not at war with the United States either, they want strategic rivalry, they want to co-determine the global rules, as far as I understand. In what way and how – this is the question since the Chinese declare the right principles, in particular pertaining to us – territorial integrity, for example.
But later they don’t vote [at the UN] for the withdrawal of Russian troops. Therefore, it means that the Chinese, declaring the right principles, interpret them at the moment of time as they need, as they need it, and this is a fundamental problem. And the Russian regime has long had no principles. You’ve heard that Putin says that he observes international law and the UN charter, particularly regarding us. And what can we say after that?
NV: We’re recording alarming trends as to where Putin is driving the world to. And this overlaps, for example, with a growing feeling that the West is getting tired of Ukraine, its support is getting weak and in general, the West wants concessions from Ukraine to Russia.
What do you think the countermeasures should be?
Klimkin: I’ll return for a second to your thesis about the [Kyiv International Institute of Sociology] survey, and a Gallup survey was conducted before that, and this is a very important thesis. By the way, I don’t rule out that Putin will somehow use these polls in his conversation with Xi. And I don’t mean how Ukrainians change or don’t change their attitude towards the West. I mean the differences in attitudes that we saw in these polls between central and western Ukraine, the differences are actually zero, none, even purely numerical. And apparently differences between our eastern and southern regions. They’re larger in the Gallup survey, and smaller in the KIIS survey, but they’re present in both polls.
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And I already feel a certain anxiety among Western politicians and experts that the thesis that we seem to have regional differences and no absolute approach, absolute unity, if you will, which we as Ukrainians were very proud of. And this thesis is coming back, I notice. For example, today I started the morning with a conversation with my German friends, they say, they don’t exclude the fact that now this thesis will start to fully develop.
NV: Are the Russians pushing it in the West?
Klimkin: That’s the problem. And, in my opinion, the problem with these surveys that you mentioned is not a change in the attitude of Ukrainians, it’s just a very clear story and I don’t blame anyone for this. Yes, we would like more help from the West, more weapons, more financial aid, reconstruction aid, the urgent one that we needed as of yesterday or the day before yesterday. And this is a completely clear story, we also think so. It doesn’t mean that someone is going to abandon us or that Ukrainians don’t believe in our partners and allies, we just think that more help should be provided.
But we also see fatigue in the West, we’re not blind or naive. But this story about the alleged regional differences, about the fact that this “Russian World” works in different ways, I think Putin will definitely try to use this “trump card” with Xi. Taiwan is very important to Xi. Presidential elections will take place there in January. Difficult elections, by the way, not trivial, with not just two candidates.
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And if you see the survey in Taiwan, I understand this is a very distant topic for Ukrainians. In recent surveys, over 60% of those who live there say: we’re not Chinese, we’re Taiwanese, that’s how we understand our identity. And I know that representatives of the Russian regime have already tried to draw parallels here in their contacts with the Chinese. That’s why these surveys you mentioned, the Gallup poll and others, worry me.
They worry me both from the point of view of trends, but also from the point of view of how Russia will use them. Both in the West, as we talked, and in the East. Since today we’re primarily talking about this Putin’s visit, it’s really extraordinary. Putin hasn’t traveled anywhere for a long time, he’s afraid of traveling. Of course, he made a stop at Kyrgyzstan for the CIS summit, so that no one would be sad. But nevertheless, this is a very, very serious topic to which we must pay attention and point out to the Chinese that our and Taiwanese histories are, as they say in Odesa, two big differences.
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Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine